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J.L. Mackie’s paper “The Subjectivity of values” makes a convincing case for why objective
values do not exist. In response, Russ Shafer-Landau’s “A Defense for Ethical
Nonnaturalism” provides a counterpoint to Mackie’s claims. However, there is more an
error theorist can say. In my paper, I argue that, while there is more an error theorist can
say, those responses are not sufficient to trump Shafer-Landau’s claims to an objective,
nonnatural ethical system. As he puts it and I affirm, ethics is not solely bound to natural
terms, like science, but is nevertheless objective, mainly because of the reasons that
support ethics. It is reason itself that provides grounding for ethics, and a natural “ethical”
substance or essence is not needed. Moreover, if we take the error theorist’s reasoning to
its eventual end, we find that error theorist’s are either confused about the scope of the
debate or their conclusions lead to unintended or incoherent consequences for the error
theorist. I conclude that ethics most likely relies upon both natural and nonnatural facts, as
opposed to one or the other.
In “The Subjectivity of Values,” J.L. Mackie (2007) states objective values do not exist (25).
Therefore, he argues that any claim about objective morality is also false, and he calls this his
moral error theory. In this paper, I will argue that error theorists are misguided. I believe they are
misguided because of Shafer-Landau’s arguments within “A Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism”
and my own arguments. While I think he and I have reasonable arguments, I will answer the
hypothetical error theorist’s relevant rejoinders with my own. If error theorists seek an archaic,
natural essence with some mystical connection to reality for the basis of morality, then they ought
to seek such an essence for other concepts. However, error theorists do not. Instead, they accept
reason and argumentation when it comes to deliberating over the nature of other concepts. The
good is no different in kind than these other concepts. Therefore, error theorists are approaching
the good and morality in a misguided and unjust way: the good is just another debatable concept
within philosophy.
Mackie begins his paper with a simple and controversial statement: “There are no objective
values” (25). By this, Mackie means that there is no natural entity we could point to which would
correlate to values. By natural entity, he means an empirically detectable property, e.g. a
chemical property, which could be scientifically investigated. For example, we have a certain
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word and concept, water, which correlates to a chemical compound, H2O. For values to be
objective by Mackie’s account, values would need an equivalent to H2O. That isn’t to say that
Mackie rejects the notion of value: he believes that subjective values do exist. An agent can value
something. Moreover, an agent can have good prudential reasons to not perform certain acts. An
agent might desire to murder an infant because one gains pleasure in doing so, but one
shouldn’t, prudentially speaking, murder infants because doing so would cause the agent to go to
jail and lose their freedom. As long as the agent’s desire to stay free within society is more
valuable to the agent than the desire to murder infants, then the agent shouldn’t murder infants.
Mackie provides two arguments for why there are no objective values. First is Mackie’s
(2007) “Argument from Relativity” (30). Mackie argues that the wide variety of values is evidence
that there are no objective values. Two sides of a moral debate can have all the relevant, natural
facts about the matter, and yet, both sides might have vastly different ethical judgments
concerning the same incident. Mackie takes it to be the case that if values were objective, and we
had all the natural facts, then the answer would be evident, but because there is still
disagreement, it is not because we do not have all the natural facts but because values are just
simply not objective. Mackie also takes it to be the case that morality and our intuitions about it
are based on the way we live rather than morality informing our way of living. What we call
“objective morality” is not action guiding but merely a description of how we live. We impart the
quality of objective moral goodness after we decide how we would prefer to live, and there is
nothing further about morality.
The second argument is Mackie’s (2007) “Argument from Queerness” (31). Objective
values, if they existed, would be qualities or relations unlike anything else we’ve discovered.
Moreover, to access such moral properties would require a special faculty, one of “moral
perception or intuition,” which would be unique to morality alone (Mackie, 2007, 31). In short, they
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would be extremely queer things. Mackie sees objective morality as currently having this mystical
quality about it, one which cannot be explained clearly through a lens of naturalism. Mackie takes
it that our ontology rarely, if ever, includes concepts that lack empirical evidence. Because
morality lacks empirical evidence for its existence, we should exclude it from our ontology.
Before giving my own responses, I would like to present Russ Shafer-Landau’s
argumentation against Mackie’s error theory in “Ethics as Philosophy: A Defense of Ethical
Nonnaturalism,” a piece which heavily influences my own reasoning (2007). After examining
Shafer-Landau’s arguments, I’ll provide my own arguments, along with what a hypothetical error
theorist might retort.
In response to the argument from relativity, Shafer-Landau turns Mackie’s critique upon
itself. His original claims about relativity said that the variety of first-order moral beliefs was
evidence that these judgments were subjective opinions rather than objective fact. However,
there is as much variety about second-order moral beliefs—that is, beliefs about the metaphysical
nature of morality, such as whether it is objective or subjective. Error theorists, if consistent in
reasoning, would need to be error theorists about their own beliefs. They would have to believe
that all this talk about whether morality is objective or subjective has no metaphysical basis to it,
and instead, all claims about the metaphysics of morality (objective, subjective, or otherwise) are
all false.
Error theorists, like Mackie, don’t believe this, though. They think they have good reason to
believe that morality is a subjective enterprise. Shafer-Landau highlights his main, positive thesis
against the error theorist’s claims: not everything within our ontology is backed by naturalism or
scientific evidence, especially in philosophy, including the error theorist’s own beliefs. Instead,
when examining concepts, we do more than just look for scientific evidence. We introspect, check
our intuitions against hypothetical cases, and I would even say we aim for a reflective equilibrium1
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about our moral beliefs.
The process of reflective equilibrium occurs when an agent takes a set of instances (moral
quandaries, in this case) and formulates underlying rules (moral precepts) from these instances. If
an agent finds each instance where a rational agent is killed by another rational agent as morally
repugnant, then the agent establishes a rule against killing other rational agents. After, the agent
retests the rules against possible cases. If a rule doesn’t cohere well with the agent’s beliefs
about novel instances, the agent reformulates the rules, and then retests the new set of rules.
Return to my earlier example: an agent may introspect about hypothetical moral instances
and find that cases of self-defense, where an attacking rational agent is killed in self defense by
another rational agent, as not morally repugnant. The deliberating agent would then refine their
moral precept to say that only murder, the intentional killing of another rational agent, is morally
impermissible, instead of self-defense or bare killing alone.
I think this is a common way we in fact do think about moral precepts. In this instance,
intention and how the killing came about played a role with our forming moral precepts. This
process of testing and rule crafting is repeated until all our instances cohere well with our rules.2
While reflective equilibrium is not part of Shafer-Landau’s positive thesis, I think this process
nicely compliments his theory, and even if this process is problematic, Shafer-Landau’s
argumentation still stands: we do not have scientific evidence for believing the error theorist. By
the error theorist’s own lights, her views are not coherent or persuasive.
Moreover, in response to Mackie’s concerns, I would suggest that there are many other
concepts—intangibles such as kindness and cruelness, intention, consciousness, or free will
(Shafer-Landau, 2007, 63)—that lack a naturalistic basis. Even concepts, such vehicle, are
difficult to define. Yet, we are not error theorists about the concept vehicle or its referents
because, despite the vagueness of the concept, we still believe we have referents that produce
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true statements. If Mackie wishes to be consistent, then I believe he should be a sweeping error
theorist about a whole host of topics, including those outside of philosophy. An intelligent error
theorist, I believe, would respond by saying this: “I would suggest taking a more conservative
approach and say that for concepts outside of morality, we appeal to something not as mystical
as whatever is the basis for objective morality. Vehicles have an actual basis, i.e. things in the
world that we can test the concept against. There is, at least, the possibility of attaining successful
reference for the concept vehicle but there is no such hope for the phantom that is objective
morality.”
In response, I would ask what the error theorist means by successful reference. Usually, by
that we mean that when we employ a certain concept, propositions that correctly apply the
concept say something true. Obviously, ex hypothesi for the error theorist, morality cannot do this,
since all claims about objective morality are false. The good can never successfully refer in this
way because for the error theorist all claims about the good and therefore morality are false. They
are supposedly false because they purport to refer to something that does not exist, namely,
objective values. I, of course, disagree with that assumption, though.
Take a similar debate: which human creations successfully refer to the word art. When we
debate about the concept art, we are trying to accurately pick out the human creations that are art
as opposed to the non-art creations. I doubt most people would say every creation is art.3
Entertainment, for instance, is not usually accepted as or intended as art. Often, entertainers say
something like, “Well, I’m just trying to entertain,” by which they mean they don’t care about the
higher attributes associated with art but only wish to excite the audience’s emotions in some way.
To return to the point, I don’t see the debate itself over the metaphysics of art as one which leads
to us believing that art doesn’t exist or that all claims about art are false. My error theorist
counterpart again would stop me here and say, “Well, the point is that there is no mystical art

Honors College Research Journal

57	
  

D|I|S|C|O|V|E|R|Y

	
  

6

	
  
essence for the creations that are art as opposed to the non-art creations.” And in response, I
would agree. I don’t think there is some mystical metaphysical “essence” that validates something
as art or some mystical metaphysical “essence” that validates something as good. However,
while I doubt these essences, I don’t doubt that good reasons exist to classify certain things as
art. Certain aesthetic qualities, the intention of the work, the depth of the piece, both cognitively
and stylistically, whether it excites our emotions in a particular way, how art often lacks function
beyond our appreciation and contemplation, etc., all inform us as to whether a work is art, or
better put, should be classified as art.4 Error theorists are stuck on empirical justification and how
our concepts refer to those things. Instead, it is more advantageous to think about concepts and
then the reasons why we classify things in a particular way.5
I still think error theorists would be unsatisfied by this response, saying that when
discussing objective morality, they believe we mean more than merely reasons for why something
is good. They believe there is an objective essence of the good and that some empirically
verifiable property connects our actions with that property. If error theorists want a natural
essence of the good to point to, then I’m not sure I could provide such a thing, granted I don’t
believe in one.6 Instead, all I can suggest is that the concept of the good operates like other
concepts, not by appealing to purely empirically verifiable properties, but rather reasons for or
against some classification as a concept.
One last point: I find it strange that Mackie is not an eliminativist about values rather than a
subjectivist. Someone who is an eliminativist about value would totally eliminate values from their
ontology rather than taking it for granted that some values exist, and in Mackie’s case, those
values are subjective in nature. He clearly believes in values and at least his own. I don’t know
what scientific evidence exists to point to Mackie’s values besides what he consciously states are
his values. If I take Mackie’s argumentation seriously, then he must believe in “furniture” for his
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subjective beliefs. I assume Mackie would cite his reports of his preferences, but I have doubts
that such reports will always be accurate. Sometimes we are wrong about what we desire.
Moreover, it’s unclear that Mackie’s statements about his preferences actually correlate to an
empirically verifiable property like Mackie demands of morality. This argumentation is in the same
vain as Shafer-Landau’s, but it accepts Mackie’s position and takes his own beliefs in account. I
assume Mackie would bet on science to prove the existence of his values, but such a bet is rather
unpersuasive in light of what Mackie argues.
I would now like to return to Mackie’s argument from queerness. Recall Mackie’s claims: he
says that if moral properties did exist, they would be extremely queer things, unlike anything else
we understand, and our ability to or faculty used to access such properties would also be as
queer as the properties themselves. Shafer-Landau responds to this claim by looking at our
ontology as a whole. Shafer-Landau wants to highlight that there are many concepts in our
standing ontology that are not backed by naturalism, including much of what we have good
reasons for believing. There are a whole host of concepts we discuss which, through an error
theorist’s lens, merely are atoms in a void, but the way we mentally process, discuss, categorize,
and name these arrangements of atoms as particular arrangements is salient and valuable.
One set of facts that is not backed by naturalism alone and we have good reason to
believe in are epistemic facts. Epistemic facts guide what we ought to believe, provided that our
beliefs are aimed at the truth. Mackie and other error theorists alike would probably find such
facts less pernicious than normative facts, despite both sets of facts as being action guiding,
meaning they tell us how we should live our lives as opposed to being a bare set of acts about the
world. While some philosophers—notably, Hume—say the distinction between “is” and “ought”
statements, facts and action guiding principles, is an insurmountable gap, Shafer-Landau takes it
for granted that there is a fact of the matter about how we should act, both rationally and morally.
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Still, my hypothetical error theorist might respond by saying, “Why should I care about
aiming my beliefs toward the truth? Why should I value the truth? There might be prudential
reasons to do so, but there’s no objective, fundamental reason why I should value the truth.
Exactly in the same way, there is no objective, fundamental reason why I should value the good.”
In response, I find myself wanting to appeal to some intrinsic value about the truth and the good,
but in a less spooky way than what Mackie would suggest. There is something about true things
which we tend to value over false things. If someone watched a mockumentary, a movie which
appears as though it is a documentary but is in fact fictional for usually comical or satirical
reasons, and that someone believed the mockumentary was in fact a documentary, then he would
probably be disappointed or feel wronged in some way.7 I think Mackie and other error theorists,
while trying to maintain their position, would press on these feelings and reactions by saying there
is still no objective reason why we should value the truth. However, their asking why they want the
truth confuses me in light of the beginning of this discussion. Error theorists wanted the good to
successfully refer to something, not falsely, but truthfully. If you really wish to believe in false
things, then there is no argument I can supply which would be persuasive. To such a person,
what is persuasive to them is what they choose is persuasive; they define the criteria for what’s
persuasive where usually the truth would suffice. But by and large, people are not relativists or
subjectivists when it comes to the nature of truth, and those that are typically confuse the truth of
their beliefs with the truth of the content of their beliefs. For instance, I believe there is a tree in my
room is true if I in fact believe that there is a tree in my room. But, the content of that belief (there
is a tree in my room) is objectively false, certainly by Mackie’s standards, since there are no trees
in my room, and we could scientifically prove this.8 The good might be intrinsically valuable in the
same way. Someone might value what is objectively bad, but they would appear confused if they
were to ask why they should value the good. To return to the earlier argumentation regarding
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epistemic facts, however, error theorists do not hold these kinds of subjectivist or relativist beliefs
regarding truth: Mackie’s version, at least, endorses a belief in objective truth. He believes some
things are objectively true, scientific judgments, on the basis that there is nothing else to the
universe besides naturalism.9
For those error theorists that are still not persuaded to accept concepts without scientific
evidence but find something compelling about Shafer-Landau’s claims about ontology, one could
turn to Richard Joyce’s fictionalism laid out in “Morality, Schmorality” (2007). One could take all
the subtracted ontology Shafer-Landau discusses and believe in that subtracted ontology as a
fiction. We might have very good reasons for treating the subtracted ontology as if it were true,
but we know, and respond when pressed, that the subtracted ontology is not in fact true.
Believing in morality might benefit each individual, but this benefit cannot make morality in fact
true. This doesn’t answer Shafer-Landau’s logical arguments against error theory10, but this
answer does respond to the practical concerns Shafer-Landau has about eliminating wide ranges
of our ontology.
I think this might be a neat way of responding to Shafer-Landau’s pragmatic concerns
regarding ontology. Like morality, it probably does benefit—meaning facilitates communication,
keeps society orderly, produces more happiness for each person, etc.—each individual to treat
certain propositions about particular concepts as truth-apt. However, I still feel this position is
lacking. One example of a concept which would most likely fall on the chopping block when it
comes to removing parts of an ontology that are not scientifically supportable are a priori
propositions. 11 Bachelors, for instance, have no natural essence which we could scientifically
point to. There is no bachelor furniture, as in, something furniture-y that’s a bachelor. What counts
as furniture to Mackie are just empirically verifiable forces and atoms in the void. A bachelor is not
empirically verifiable. Still, there is a truth about bachelors, one which doesn’t appear deniable.12
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Bachelors just are unmarried males. The truth about that statement appears to be more than a
fiction, and most would say there is successful reference between the subject and the predicate.
The astute error theorists and fictionalist would argue that in the case of bachelors, we’ve taken a
particular thing and placed a certain value upon it by sorting it. In this case, unmarried men are
called bachelors, but there is no bachelor-ness out in the world. Bachelor is just a placeholder for
the idea of an unmarried male. Even then there is a question about whether this sorting is a good
sorting, and an error theorist would stumble here once more. Like epistemic facts, it’s not exactly
clear how error theorists would account for ‘good’ sorting and ‘bad’ sorting.13
At this point in the argument, it seems to me that debate is moving further away from ethics
and metaethics and more towards metaphysics and philosophy of language, particularly how we
name or conceptualize things. For those concerns, I have little experience with arguments outside
of metaethical debates. Prima facie from someone who knows little, the worry about how we name
a collection of atoms, if that is what is meant by sorting certain groupings of atoms into a concept
category, is a worry about concepts and naming rather than a worry about the concepts
themselves. There is nothing mystical that links bachelors to unmarried males, but bachelors are
unmarried males. Unmarried males could be called something else, say schmachelors in Joyce’s
fashion, but what is important is whether the correct idea is communicated. If there were no
bachelors, then all we could successfully refer to would be schmachelors. If a man, Bill, was a
schmachelor and someone said, “Bill’s a schmachelor because he was married earlier this year,”
then the person proclaiming such would be wrong because they are proclaiming something false.
Bill cannot be a schmachelor if he is indeed married. Still, in the case of morality, error theorists
would not be persuaded because they would say treating morality in this way would be, as Joyce
put it, trying to discuss the nature of witches when no witches exist (2007, 53-54). Without
scientific evidence to verify witches against, we can make no true claims about witches. As I have
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argued, however, I don’t know why solely scientifically proven concepts are all we should pay
attention to.14 Our conceptual analysis15 of the good can inform us as to whether our propositions
about the good are in fact true. If naturalism were true, then the fictionalist would have a better
case. Because non-natural concepts are open to us, as I have argued, there is more we can use
for successful reference than just natural properties. Good then needs to be investigated like any
other concept.
Therefore, I don’t think that morality succumbs to error theory. Error theory is too
destructive when it comes to ontology, epistemology and language, and it fails to pass its own
critiques. While Mackie may not agree, I believe conceptual analysis of the good is a worthwhile
enterprise to invest, particularly because naturalism alone is unpersuasive. There are, as ShaferLandau argues, non-natural properties and concepts we care about and take seriously, not solely
as a fiction, but as real existing things. Successful reference, with respect to concepts, is not
limited to natural properties either. Good reason and a solid justifying process—like reflective
equilibrium—can provide a basis for objective morality. Morality doesn’t have a spooky basis in a
mystical essence, but the good is a non-natural property. While scientific investigation might not
inform our knowledge about morality, reflecting on and discussing the nature of the good in real
and hypothetical cases can—and does—inform us about morality as a whole.

ENDNOTES
1

For more on this, see Nelson Goodman (1955) on the process of reflective equilibrium.
For those interested, see Stephen Stitch (1988) for problems concerning epistemic reflective equilibrium. I think
Stitch’s view is incoherent, since it relies upon a western notion of truth and rationality to be persuasive. However, his
paper still provides a counterpoint to the process.
3
There is a common notion that everything is art (or art to someone), but if everything were art, then the employment
of the term would be pointless and vacuous. I take it that people don’t intuitively take the concept art to be pointless
or vacuous.
4
Error theorists might argue that I’m missing a big distinction between naming and being. I’ll discuss this distinction
later, but it suffices to say that I don’t see this as huge of a distinction as the error theorist might, particularly if our
reference is still successful.
5
An error theorist might complain and say the justification is the focus. I believe my discussion on reflective
equilibrium answers those concerns.
6
Some philosophers, such as R.M. Hare (1952), have argued for the good as being a supervenient property,
meaning that if there is a change in the natural properties of an event, then there is a change in the moral properties
2
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of that event. This theory creates a tight connection between the moral and natural properties of an event.
7
For a real life example, see I’m Still Here, Joaquin Phoenix’s mockumentary which resulted in such reactions (Casey
Affleck, 2010).
8
If you find this reasoning unpersuasive, I encourage you to read Paul Boghossian (2006) for elegant argumentation
against factual relativism and constructivism.
9
Revisit Shafer-Landau’s argumentation against the relativity argument for why this second-order belief might be
questionable in light of Mackie’s theory.
10
Fictionalism takes error theory as an assumption.
11
Here, I’m making an allusion to Kant’s theories on analytic, a priori propositions. My arguments later on will continue
this trend with the good in mind.
12
It should be noted that there is significantly less debate over what counts as a bachelor.
13
The implications here could be devastating and lead to an unraveling of language for error theorists. I think an error
theorist would respond with some sort of functionalist account about sorting, but the nature of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ sorting
would still require objectivity because language requires objectivity. There is no reason why such an account couldn’t
work for morality as well, but that would lead to objective rules, a problem for the error theorist.
14
The good could be a mixture of non-natural and natural properties, but it is at least non-natural.
15
I think our linguistic use of the good matters as well, but I’m not willing to fully argue for that position since doing so
would require more space than I have. The good, most likely, will be a mixture of things, not solely any one property.
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